Moral Distinctions between Passive and Active Euthanasia by Chan, Jonathan Kai Shun
6/16/2017 
1 
 
PI/ Law 099 FINAL Essay  
Moral Distinctions between Passive and Active Euthanasia 
 Morally speaking, what distinguishes passive from active euthanasia? Is there even a 
moral distinction? Before we can answer these questions, it will serve us well to get a sense of 
what either type of euthanasia involves. Euthanasia is often termed ‘mercy killing’ or ‘assisted 
suicide.’ It is the intentional ending of a patient’s life to ease his pain and suffering (typically 
caused by some terminal illness).1 Euthanasia can be classified as passive or active. Passive 
euthanasia involves withholding common treatments (drugs, operations, respirators etc.) 
necessary for a patient to continue living. Active euthanasia, on the other hand, involves the use 
of lethal substances or forces (e.g. a lethal injection) to kill the patient.2 The prima facie 
distinction between active and passive euthanasia is that the former involves killing a patient, 
while the latter involves letting the patient die.3 Thus, some philosophers4 suggest that by asking 
whether there is a moral distinction between active and passive euthanasia, we are really asking 
whether there is a moral distinction between ‘killing’ and ‘letting die.’ With that said, solving 
this age-old ‘killing’ versus ‘letting die’ moral dilemma is far beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, I believe we need not fully resolve the dilemma in order to gain insight into the moral 
differences between active and passive euthanasia. While we must inevitably dip our toes into 
the larger debate, we will tackle only a specific subcase of ‘killing’ versus ‘letting die’ in the 
                                                          
1 "Euthanasia and assisted suicide." NHS Choices, National Health Service (NHS), 
www.nhs.uk/Conditions/Euthanasiaandassistedsuicide/Pages/Introduction.aspx. Accessed 7 June 2017. 
2 Ibid.  
3 Rachels, James. "Active and Passive Euthanasia." New England Journal of Medicine, PDF ed., vol. 292, no. 2, 9 
Jan. 1975, pp. 78. 
4 These philosophers include James Rachels, Fiona Woollard, and Frances Howard-Snyder. 
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realm of hospice care. This specificity places some realistic constraints on the issue that will help 
us reach some moral conclusions.  
 In this paper, I will first examine arguments both for and against the claim that there 
exists a moral difference between active and passive euthanasia. Next, I will examine 
considerations that should play a role in determining whether either active or passive euthanasia 
should even be morally permissible at all in a specific case. I will also attempt to apply the 
ethical ideology known as the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) to both types of euthanasia, and 
assess what moral conclusions the doctrine would arrive at for each. Only after clearing such 
ground will I suggest why we are not equipped to make a blanket statement about whether active 
euthanasia is morally different from passive euthanasia; only the specific circumstances of each 
case, as well as the ethical framework used to assess each case, can clarify what moral 
distinctions, if any, exist. 
I. Arguments For and Against the Existence of a Moral Difference between Active 
and Passive Euthanasia 
First, let us review the arguments claiming that there is indeed a moral difference 
between active and passive euthanasia. In the medical world, conventional doctrine presupposes 
that such a difference exists.5 Most notably, the difference is implied by the Hippocratic Oath, 
embodied by the maxim: “do no harm” (curiously, the maxim itself does not appear in the oath).6 
The Hippocratic Oath has strong deontological (duty-driven) connotations of non-maleficence: a 
doctor above all must not cause harm to his patient. Using this purely deontological framework, 
                                                          
5 Rachels, James. "Active and Passive Euthanasia." New England Journal of Medicine, PDF ed., vol. 292, no. 2, 9 
Jan. 1975, pp. 78. 
6 Shmerling, Robert H. "First, do no harm." Harvard Health Blog, Harvard Medical School, 13 Oct. 2015, 
www.health.harvard.edu/blog/first-do-no-harm-201510138421. Accessed 7 June 2017. 
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it is clear that active euthanasia (e.g. administering a lethal injection) is morally forbidden 
because it violates the deontological duty not to kill. What about passive euthanasia? At first, it 
might seem that passive euthanasia is morally permissible by the “first, do no harm” maxim 
because the doctor is merely allowing a patient to die (e.g. the doctor refrains from performing 
an operation). However, consider the passive euthanasia case in which the doctor removes some 
apparatus that sustains the life of a patient, say a respirator. The doctor is doing something; he is 
removing the respirator. So, is passive euthanasia really an ‘allowing’? Philosopher Michael 
Moore has explored this conundrum, and classifies passive euthanasia as a type of “non-omissive 
allowing.”7 By turning off the respirator, the doctor performs an act of “double-prevention”8; the 
doctor prevents something (the respirator) from preventing the patient’s death. Double-
preventions are not causes (of death) if we accept omissions are not causes.9 Thus, for the 
purposes of moral evaluation, a double-prevention should be judged in the same way an 
omission would be judged. Furthermore, Moore maintains that this particular act of double-
prevention – passive euthanasia – is morally permissible because the doctor returns the patient to 
a moral “baseline.”10 By removing the respirator, the doctor merely removes a defense to death 
and lets ‘nature’ take its course (e.g. the illness kills the patient), omitting to provide support for 
the patient that he provided in the first place. The patient essentially dies the death he would have 
died anyways had the doctor not intervened at all. The upshot is that the moral distinction 
between active and passive euthanasia is preserved. 
                                                          
7 Moore, Michael S. Causation and Responsibility. Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 60. 
8 Ibid., pp. 62. 
9 There is much debate about whether omissions, or ‘negative causes,’ are true ‘causes’. Moore believes they are 
not. Other philosophers, including Jonathan Schaffer (Schaffer, “The Case for Negative Causation”, 2004), believe 
they are (for example, all voluntary human actions are due to muscle contractions, which result from the absence of 
a protein from a binding site). For this argument, however, we will assume omissions are not causes. 
10 Ibid., pp. 63. 
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A closely related argument for the existence of a moral difference also relies on an 
acceptance of deontological ethics. This argument can be framed in terms of the stringency of 
negative versus positive moral duties. Inventor of the well-known trolley problem, Philippa Foot, 
argues that our ‘negative duties’ (e.g. our duty to refrain from killing) are more stringent than our 
‘positive duties’ (e.g. our duty to relieve the patient’s suffering).11 By this logic, we are more 
strongly prohibited from practicing active euthanasia than we are obligated to practice it in order 
to relieve pain. In other words, our ‘negative rights’ (e.g. rights against being killed) are stronger 
than our ‘positive rights’ (e.g. rights to a doctor to relieve our suffering).12 Active euthanasia is 
therefore morally impermissible. In contrast, practicing passive euthanasia (a “non-omissive 
allowing” according to Moore) does not violate a stringent negative deontological duty by Foot’s 
reasoning, establishing a moral gap between active and passive euthanasia. It is important to 
note, however, that there exist other positive and negative duties that complicate the issue. For 
example, if we consider the doctor’s positive duty to save the patient, then neither type of 
euthanasia might be permissible at all in some cases. Furthermore, if we consider the negative 
duty not to interfere with the patient’s self-autonomy, active euthanasia might be morally 
permissible in cases where passive euthanasia is not (discussed more in depth later). The 
interplay of multiple positive and negative duties makes reaching moral conclusions quite tricky. 
 Now, let us examine arguments claiming that there exists no moral difference between 
active and passive euthanasia. Perhaps the most influential set of arguments come from 
utilitarian13 philosopher James Rachels in his article “Active and Passive Euthanasia.” As a 
                                                          
11 Thomson, Judith Jarvis. “Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem.” The Monist, vol. 59, no. 2, 1976, pp. 
206. 
12 Woollard, Fiona and Howard-Snyder, Frances, "Doing vs. Allowing Harm", The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/doing-allowing/>. 
13 Hitchcock, Christopher. Class Lecture, PI/Law 99, May 16, 2017, “Doing vs. Allowing II”, Slide 17. 
6/16/2017 
5 
 
utilitarian, Rachel subscribes to an ethical theory promoting actions that maximize human 
happiness and minimize suffering; deontological concerns are irrelevant or downplayed. In his 
article, Rachels argues that the distinction between active and passive euthanasia has no rational 
basis for several reasons.14 First, Rachels notes that active euthanasia is often more humane than 
passive euthanasia. For example, Rachels cites early infant care cases in which some babies born 
with Down’s syndrome have congenital defects such as intestinal obstructions, and require 
operations too intensive that the parents and doctors are unwilling to operate. So, they opt for 
passive euthanasia. In these cases, allowing the infant to die is excruciating; the process is 
physically agonizing to the dying infant and emotionally taxing for the parents and medical staff. 
Practicing passive euthanasia in these cases certainly seems cruel and morally wrong.  
 Second, Rachel argues that decisions of life and death are often made on irrelevant 
grounds.15 In the same case of the babies with Down’s syndrome, Rachels says that the parents 
and the doctors must first judge whether an operation to save the infant should be performed; 
they judge whether the life of an infant with Down’s syndrome is worth living, or whether it 
would be more merciful to euthanize the infant. In making this tough moral decision, Rachel 
argues that it makes no sense to consider whether or not the infant has intestinal obstructions or 
not (these medical conditions are irrelevant to the moral question).  
 Third, Rachel believes the moral distinction between active and passive euthanasia is 
exactly the moral distinction between ‘killing’ and ‘letting die,’ and that all other things held 
equal, this moral distinction does not exist at all. Why not? Take the case16 of two greedy 
                                                          
14 Rachels, James. "Active and Passive Euthanasia." New England Journal of Medicine, PDF ed., vol. 292, no. 2, 9 
Jan. 1975, pp. 78. 
15 Hitchcock, Christopher. Class Lecture, PI/Law 99, May 16, 2017, “Doing vs. Allowing II”, Slide 22. 
16 Rachels, James. "Active and Passive Euthanasia." New England Journal of Medicine, PDF ed., vol. 292, no. 2, 9 
Jan. 1975, pp. 79. 
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individuals, Abe and Joe, who both stand to gain a substantial inheritance should one of their 
infant relatives die. To acquire his inheritance, Abe drowns the infant in a bathtub, staging the 
scene to look like an accident. Joe plans to do the exact same thing, but before he can drown his 
infant relative, the infant hits its head and begins to drown. Joe sits and does nothing. From this 
hypothetical example, Rachel is fully convinced that Abe and Joe are equally morally guilty, and 
thus there exists no moral distinction between killing and letting die, between active and passive 
euthanasia.  
 Rachel’s final argument takes the form of criticizing conventional doctrine that 
presupposes a moral distinction between active and passive euthanasia. In direct opposition to 
Moore, Rachel believes that passive euthanasia is not a morally permissible “non-omissive 
allowing.” By doing nothing (e.g. not operating), the doctor is doing something: he is letting the 
patient die. Rachel believes that the decision to let a patient die “is subject to moral appraisal in 
the same way that a decision to kill would be subject to moral appraisal.”17 For the purposes of 
moral assessment, ‘letting die’ is the same as a ‘killing.’ Thus, in euthanasia cases, active 
euthanasia is almost always the more merciful, less painful option. 
II. Considerations that Influence the Morality of Either Type of Euthanasia 
 There are several important considerations that influence the morality of either passive or 
active euthanasia in a specific case. The most obvious one is the patient’s self-autonomy, which 
includes the patient’s personal beliefs on the permissibility of euthanasia itself or the supposed 
moral differences between passive and active euthanasia. Often closely connected with the 
patient’s religious or secular positions, the patient’s autonomy can also be encapsulated by 
                                                          
17 Rachels, James. "Active and Passive Euthanasia." New England Journal of Medicine, PDF ed., vol. 292, no. 2, 9 
Jan. 1975, pp. 80. 
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philosopher Judith Thomson’s notion of claim.18 In libertarian societies, there is a strong belief 
that as a rational, intelligent being, you have claim or ownership over your own body. You have 
a ‘right to die,’ and doctors (or the state) have no authority to interfere with this right. Your 
individual preferences on how you want to die (via passive or active euthanasia, or via 
euthanasia at all) should matter immensely to the morality of the practice in a specific case. 
Organizations like Dignity in Dying19 urge that doctors respect patients’ personal beliefs on 
hospice and palliative care, allowing the patients to dictate the timing and manner in which they 
die.  
 Self-autonomy is not and should not be all-important, however. Consider the case in 
which the patient is a depressed teenager who recently broke up with his lover. Or a mentally 
unstable housewife who broke her arm in a car accident. Suppose both patients request that the 
doctor euthanize them to end their suffering. If autonomy is all that mattered, the doctor should 
comply in both cases. In both cases however, few of us would agree that either type of 
euthanasia is morally permissible. What considerations are we taking into account here? It is 
clearly not the patients’ autonomies. We are considering the type and degree of the patients’ 
suffering, as well as the patients’ best interests. The former of these considerations can also be 
expressed in terms of the patients’ chances of (emotional and physical) recovery. We would say 
that the teenager is just going through a bad breakup, and that the housewife’s arm will heal. 
These are not terminal, incurable conditions, and so it doesn’t make sense to consider euthanasia 
altogether. 
                                                          
18 Thomson, Judith Jarvis. “Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem.” The Monist, vol. 59, no. 2, 1976, pp. 
215. 
19 "Our Position." Campaign for Dignity in Dying, Dignity in Dying, www.dignityindying.org.uk/assisted-dying/our-
position/. Accessed 7 June 2017. 
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 The latter consideration, often termed paternalism,20 is more controversial. This 
consideration involves limiting a patient’s liberty or autonomy in order to promote his well-
being. By refusing the patients’ requests to be euthanized, the doctor (or the law) is making a 
decision that the patients would supposedly make if they were in full control of their rational 
faculties (if the teenager were not love-struck, if the housewife were mentally competent). 
Advocates of paternalism argue that these patients should not have a ‘right to die,’ or at least 
should not have a ‘right to commit suicide.’ These advocates would be supported by legal 
precedent. For example, in Washington v. Glucksberg, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the 
Constitution does not protect an individual’s right to commit suicide, and that the state had a 
legitimate interest in preventing assisted suicide to preserve human life and to protect vulnerable 
groups (the poor, elderly, disabled etc.) from abusing euthanasia. 21 Critics of paternalism, on the 
other hand, raise concerns of an overbearing, coercive ‘nanny state’ in which personal liberties 
and choices are unduly interfered with. 
 When determining whether either active or passive euthanasia is morally permissible in a 
specific case, a patient’s self-autonomy, chance of recovery, and paternalism should all come 
into consideration. Furthermore, our analysis has been primarily patient-centric; the decision to 
euthanize someone often affects those around him emotionally and financially. In cases where 
the patient is comatose, this decision is even more complicated because the doctor might only 
have indirect evidence of the patient’s wishes from family members or legal agents. All these 
factors influence the moral permissibility of the decision and should be weighed carefully. 
 
                                                          
20 Hitchcock, Christopher. Class Discussion, PI/Law 99, May 16, 2017. 
21 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 138 L. Ed.2d 772 (1997). 
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III. Application of the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) 
Before we apply the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) to euthanasia, let’s first familiarize 
ourselves with the DDE and convince ourselves it makes sense to apply it in the first place. The 
DDE is a set of ethical criteria for evaluating the permissibility of an otherwise moral action 
when the action would simultaneously cause some harmful side effect.22 Introduced by Saint 
Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theologica (c. 1270), the DDE strongly incorporates Christian 
ethical values. According to the DDE, in order for an action (that has good and bad 
consequences) to be morally permissible, the following typical conditions must be met: 
(a) The act must be morally good (or at least cannot violate a deontological obligation).  
(b) The agent must intend the good outcome (but is allowed to foresee a bad outcome(s)). 
(c) The good effect(s) must outweigh the bad effect(s). 
(d) There is no other way to obtain the good outcome without causing the harm(s) (or 
some other equally bad harm(s)). 
(e) The harm(s) done must not be a means by which the good outcome(s) is achieved; the 
good and bad effects must flow directly from the action from a causal perspective.23   
In both cases of euthanasia, it seems natural to apply the DDE. The DDE concerns the 
issue of when it is permissible to perform an action that has both good consequences – the 
relieving of the patient’s pain and suffering – and bad consequences – the death of the patient. 
Already, we have made a key assumption: death is a bad outcome and living is a good outcome; 
life is not suffering, so to speak. To simplify the comparison between the two types of 
                                                          
22 McIntyre, Alison, "Doctrine of Double Effect", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/double-effect/>. 
23 Hitchcock, Christopher. Class Lecture, PI/Law 99, April 27, 2017, “The Doctrine of Double Effect”, Slides 19-20. 
6/16/2017 
10 
 
euthanasia, will also assume that the patient’s condition warrants the practice of some form of 
euthanasia (no medical alternatives exist). 
Before analyzing how the DDE applies differentially to the two types of euthanasia, let us 
see which conditions are satisfied by both. Both types of euthanasia satisfy condition (b): 
euthanasia is aimed at reducing a patient’s suffering, and the doctor intends this good outcome. 
Both also satisfy (d): euthanasia is the only resort to treating the painful terminal illness (we 
assumed medicine or other therapies would not help the patient).  
We will now discern between the two types of euthanasia cases on the remaining 
conditions: (a), (c), (e). First, let’s apply these conditions to passive euthanasia. In this case, the 
bad effects are a combination of the patient’s death and his increased suffering as a result of 
withheld treatment. The good outcome is relief from suffering. If we use Moore’s conclusions, 
passive euthanasia does not violate a deontological duty (the ‘non-omissive allowing’ did not 
cause the patient’s death); thus (a) is satisfied. In passive euthanasia, does the good outcome 
outweigh the bad effects (c)? The answer to this question is highly dependent on the 
circumstances. In certain passive euthanasia cases, the patient’s suffering is brief (a comatose 
patient dies minutes after the respirator is removed), and in other cases, the patient’s suffering is 
protracted and undignified (the Down’s syndrome infant who must suffer dehydration and 
infection for hours or days). We must decide on a case-by-case basis at which point the patient’s 
additional suffering and death (bad effects) outweigh his relief from suffering (positive 
outcome). How about (e)? I believe that condition is met. To reach this conclusion, however, we 
must we label passive euthanasia as a “double prevention,” which according to Moore, is not a 
cause. The doctor is incapable of using the patient’s death as a means to achieve the good 
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outcome because the doctor does not cause anything. Thus, both good and bad effects flow 
immediately from the double prevention (on a causal timeline), satisfying (e). 
Now we turn to active euthanasia. In this case, the bad effect is simply the patient’s death 
(e.g. the lethal injection is quick and painless). The good outcome is the same as in the passive 
euthanasia case: relief from suffering. Clearly, (a) is violated because killing violates a 
deontological duty. Interestingly, I believe active euthanasia passes (c), a condition which 
passive euthanasia might not always satisfy. In an active euthanasia case, the bad effect is 
certainly smaller than that in the passive euthanasia case (which entails additional patient 
suffering from withholding treatment), while the good effect (relief from suffering) is just as 
desirable as in the passive euthanasia case. Unlike passive euthanasia, active euthanasia violates 
(e) because administering the lethal injection relies on the patient’s death to achieve his relief 
from suffering; the bad outcome is a means to achieve the good effect. 
In short, passive euthanasia might or might not violate condition (c) of the DDE, 
depending on the condition the patient suffers from. On the other hand, active euthanasia violates 
two conditions (a), (e) of the DDE. If violating fewer conditions of the DDE indicates moral 
correctness, then passive euthanasia is more morally permissible than active euthanasia. Again, 
we have made some implicit (but not universally true) assumptions to reach our conclusions. For 
example, let us consider morphine therapy as a type of active euthanasia (because it causes an 
accelerated death). In this case, condition (e) does not seem to be violated because a hastened 
death is merely a foreseeable bad effect, and is not a means to achieve the good outcome (relief 
from suffering). In this case, although the DDE still seems to rule in favor of passive euthanasia, 
the moral distinction between the two types of euthanasia is certainly undermined. 
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After considering the views of Moore and Foot that point to a moral distinction between 
the two types of euthanasia, as well as Rachels’ arguments claiming that no distinction exists, I 
am inclined to believe the applied moral framework is causing the difference of opinion. Moore 
and Foot to a large extent subscribe to a deontological code of ethics and believe that only 
passive euthanasia is morally permissible, whereas Rachels is an unequivocal utilitarian and 
believes that active euthanasia is always morally preferable in the interest of reducing suffering. 
Similarly, we observe that passive euthanasia is more morally permissible than active euthanasia 
when the deontologically-driven Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) is applied. In exploring 
considerations of a patient’s self-autonomy, the severity of his illness, and paternalism, we also 
find that the morality of the two types of euthanasia is specific to each case; a doctor must 
balance a respect for the patient’s wishes with the patient’s best interests.   
 
IV. Conclusions 
 The thesis that practicing active euthanasia is morally worse than practicing passive 
euthanasia, much like the thesis that ‘killing’ is worse than ‘letting die,’ cannot be answered 
simply. The type of moral framework – deontological versus utilitarian – used to assess the 
practices, as well as other case-specific considerations, highly influence the moral permissibility 
of each type of euthanasia. Furthermore, we have not considered practical matters that might 
sway our moral conclusions. Even if we assume both active and passive euthanasia are morally 
permissible, there remain significant obstacles in regulating euthanasia in such a way that the law 
would be satisfied. For example, we would still need to deal with valid concerns about abusing 
euthanasia as a cost-effective means to murder the terminally ill, or perverting euthanasia to 
undermine the dignity and value of the lives of people who are disabled.  
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